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1 Introduction 
 
"The ploughman shall go out in March and turn the same earth he has turned before. 
 By then what wrong will the black earth cover, what wrong will have been done. 
 We wait and the time is short, but waiting is long."  
                                                                                                                 T. S. Eliot 
 
September 11 reminded us that terrorism as a method to spread of mass fear is not only 
used by authoritarian states and dictatorships but also by non-state actors, in this case the 
network Al Qu’aida. Undoubtedly, what is now called 9/11 came as a shock to all of us 
although it was not the first instance of spectacular non-state violence and terrorism. Yet it 
was a unique case of wanton destruction directed at a national and global nerve center. It is 
different from acts grounded in organizations with clear political goals such as ethno-
nationalist movements which are usually labeled terrorist by the governments of countries 
affected – for example, the Basque ETA in Spain or the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in 
Northern Ireland. 9/11 certainly has global ramifications which transcend the regional or 
national character of the organizations just mentioned. Yet while 9/11 may mark a turning 
point in the history of non-state terrorism, it is part of the politics of terrorism and reflects the 
changing trench lines and clashes in world politics, in this case the world after the Cold War. 
To classify the phenomenon is fraught with difficulties, not least because the term terrorism is 
itself part of a semantic war. For example, during the Cold War the USA spoke of Moscow as 
the source of terrorism, and in the post Cold War disorder since 2001 the networks of Al 
Qu’aida around Osama bin Laden have become the center of attention. Increasingly, fears of 
communist takeover and infiltration have been replaced in popular and mass media coverage 
by more diffuse perceptions of transnational threats associated with organized crime, drug 
trafficking and environmental disasters – and not to forget international migration. 
These policy areas have been characterized by securitization. This refers to the overall 
process of turning a policy issue such as drug trafficking or international migration into a 
security issue. The term securitization refers to a perception of an existent threat to the ability 
of a nationally bound society to maintain and reproduce itself. Securitization has emerged in 
a new academic literature in the field of international relations & international politics, which 
even before 9/11, has begun to highlight more fundamental concerns about ‘new’ security 
issues. Such new security issues comprise very different phenomena ranging from 
international terrorism, ethno-national strife to environmental degradation, food and energy 
scarcities, drug trafficking, population growth, illegal viz. unauthorized migration, and 
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organized crime – to mention only the most prominent ones. Most noteworthy, not all of 
these issues are necessarily state-centered, as in the old paradigm about “national security” 
(Buzan et al. 1998). It is thus not surprising that the post-Cold War period has seen efforts to 
view international migration as an important regional and geo-strategic dynamic with 
potentially crucial effects upon states, societies and their security (Weiner 1995). The 
migration-security analysis extends the nave-gazing view at the OECD world with a more 
comprehensive analysis including both the developed and developing world.  
After 9/11, it is worth noting that mass-cultural fantasies about catastrophes caused by 
terrorists have been around for several decades. Even academic publications, such as 
Jessica Stern’s The Ultimate Terrorists – published two years before 9/11 (Stern 1999), start 
with the scenario of an atomic bomb devastating Manhattan. Quite often, dire and populist 
scenarios have been connected also to international migration, alluding to the proverbial 
“other” and “stranger” as a source of threat to “our” jobs, housing and borders, but also more 
far-reaching ontological threats to the borders of sovereign states, bodily security, moral 
values, collective identities and cultural homogeneity. Examples include not only reports in 
manifold organs of the popular press but also academic worst-case scenarios in fields such 
as demography (e.g. Birg 2001) and political studies (e.g. Kurth 1994). This connection 
between international migration, on the one hand, and human and state security, on the 
other hand, is called here the migration-security nexus.  
In such a complex setup, the question cannot simply be how international population 
movements contribute to create conflicts within and between states. Instead, it is also 
important to ask why migration has increasingly become a matter of security. Why has the 
migration-security nexus developed? In other words, why have quite a few citizens in the 
West have taken recourse to sometimes fantastic threats posed by international migrants 
even before 9/11? And what are the consequences for immigration and immigrant 
integration? There is ample evidence to look at the consequences. After all, at least in the 
discursive realm, the responses to the events on 9/11 by politicians and journalists have 
reinforced the migration-security nexus, dramatizing a publicly convenient link between 
international migration and security. Governments all over Western Europe and North 
America have not only strengthened border viz. external controls but also internal controls of 
non-citizen immigrants. In the country obviously most affected by 9/11, the USA, institutional 
responses have been the most far-reaching. For example, the new U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS), which formally opened for business in early 2003, consolidated 
some 170,000 government personnel from 22 agencies – including the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS). It is the largest modification of the U.S. federal bureaucracy 
since the founding of the Pentagon more than 50 years ago during World War Two, and 
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suggests that security threats are now increasingly seen also as internal ones. In Germany, 
to give another example for the repercussions of 9/11, the reactions first delayed the 
passage of the new immigration law because governing and opposition parties could not 
agree on tighter checks upon applicants for citizenship. Eventually, the fallout of 9/11, among 
other factors, played a role for the law to be delayed indefinitely. These two examples 
suggest that there is much to be gained from a more systematic analysis of the 
consequences of 9/11 for the unfolding migration-security nexus. 
Towards this end three propositions are posited: 
1.1 Proposition 1: Context of the Migration-Security Nexus 
The end of the Cold War has widened the political space for actors in the public sphere to 
focus on diffuse and hard-to-grasp security threats that do not emanate from sovereign 
states but from non-state actors, involving issues such as crime, drugs, migration. 
International migration has served as a convenient reference point for unspecific fears. The 
depiction of international migration as a security threat in the West has unwillingly contributed 
to what the American political scientist Samuel Huntington has termed the “clash of 
civilizations” (Huntington 1995). Securitizing migration reinforces the very stereotypes about 
cultural fears and clashes that politicians publicly deny and abstain.  
1.2 Proposition 2: Unintended Consequences of Securitizing 
Migration 
Securitizing policies such as stepped-up border controls and stricter internal surveillance of 
immigrants produces manifold unintended effects. Among others, securitizing policy issues 
creates higher expectations among voters that governments are actually able to effectively 
control transnational movements. This is in stark contrast to the past few decades, where 
measures such as border control could be viewed and interpreted as largely symbolic 
measures. In turn, the rising expectations generated by increased external and internal 
controls among the populace may lead governments to continue presenting transnational 
movements as grave security risks. In the end, this may create incentives for political actors 
to engage in symbolic meta-politics. 
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1.3 Proposition 3: Consequences for Immigrant Integration 
9/11 entails ambiguous consequences for immigrant integration. Clearly, the levels of 
harassment against immigrants from the Middle East increased considerably, at least on the 
short term. Yet the crisis situation has also sparked internal debates within Muslim immigrant 
groups and organizations about the mode of accommodation to the societies of settlement. 
This may even lead to an increased immersion into the politics of the respective national 
immigration states. General attitudes and the broad outlines of policies towards cultural 
pluralism will probably not be significantly affected by 9/11. 
The first part of the following analysis opens the historical window of opportunity in which 
international migration has turned into a security issue. Specific reference is made to the 
post-Cold War period. The second part briefly lists some of the consequences of 
securitization of international migration, namely increased meta-politics which connects 
social problems such unemployment and security threats to migration and immigration. The 
third section turns to the less than clear-cut implications of 9/11 for the incorporation of new 
immigrant groups, in particular the category Muslims. The discussion closes with 
perspectives for research on the role of non-state, transnational actors in national and world 
politics. 
 
2 The Historical-Structural Background – 
Furthering the Linkage of Migration and Security 
In recent times, migration as a security threat has emerged with end of the Cold War. 
Transnational diasporas, in particular, such as some Islamic groups are seen by some 
observers to have taken recourse to violent means in order to escape a cul-de-sac in what 
they perceive as Western values, political orders and styles of life (cf. Lewis 2003). While 
politics has often connected international migration to security issues over the past 150 
years, the end of the Cold War has been the most recent stimulus which favored the spread 
of objectless fear. This historical threshold not only meant the disappearance of a powerful 
external threat to security of the West but also the loss of an important source of cohesion 
between the diverse groups which constitute the Western world. This transformation and the 
fall of some authoritarian regimes opened up a space for marginalized identities in Eastern 
Europe, Central and even Southeast Asia to more freely and sometimes quite aggressively 
assert suppressed national and ethnic identities. In this changing inter- and transnational 
context, even sovereign states have begun to view security as the collective management of 
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sub- or transnational threats and the policing of borders and the internal realm, rather than 
just the defense of territory against external attack.  
In Europe, the perceived resurgence of Islam as a political force in increasingly multiethnic 
societies has been often discussed in connection with Muslim immigrants as such, but above 
all with regard to diasporas. Relations between countries such as France and Algeria or 
Germany and Turkey have been fraught by the export and import of conflicts surrounding 
politicized forms of Islam and national liberation. Apart from substantial human security and 
state security issues involved in border-crossing authoritarian social movements such as the 
Kurdish PKK, diasporas have become the quintessential expression of globalization 
associated with the movement of people across borders – as distinct from the flow of goods, 
capital and services (on diasporas and security, see Sheffer 1993 and Davies 2000). Such 
transnational communities are by no means confined to Muslim communities. One specific 
form of transnational community – diaspora – denotes ethno-national and/or religious groups 
who have settled in a country different from the country of origin, who have remained or 
turned into minority groups, are frequently resisting assimilation, and strive for return to an 
(imagined) homeland, often after the experience of forced dispersal (Faist 2000a: chapter 7). 
This description includes the archetypal Jewish experience, followed by Armenians and 
Palestinians. In other situations, transnational communities comprise political dissidents, 
such as some Cubans in the USA, former indentured labor, such as Chinese or middlemen 
minorities such as Indians all over the world. Reference to such groups has been ideal for 
setting disloyalty on the public agenda in debates over dual citizenship, and lacking 
accountability viz. legitimacy in conflicts over national unity. Public debates also include the 
allegations of the extraordinary influence of small lobbies on foreign policies. Notably the 
Jewish, Greek and Armenian diasporas in the USA are thought to profoundly affect foreign 
policy on behalf of their homeland through means such as military and economic assistance, 
arms sales, media pressure, petitions, and electoral campaign threats (cf. Shain 1989). 
Public and academic attention has thus focused almost exclusively on the negative 
consequences of transnational organizations and communities for the countries of 
settlement. This is surprising at first sight because such border-crossing groups can also be 
thought and may indeed have – under propitious circumstances – positive effects as conduits 
for the rule of law and the spread of civil and human rights (Keck & Sikkink 1998). 
Nowadays, the conditions for an effective mix of territorial exit and political voice (cf. 
Hirschman 1970) have increased because most emigration countries do not resemble the 
strong authoritarian states of the early and mid-20th century. Transnational activists thus 
encounter somewhat more propitious conditions to reinforce political transitions towards rule 
of law in their home countries.  
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And even if we doubted the utopian visions of transnational actors as conduits for human 
rights and democracy, there is clear evidence not only for the import of conflicts in the wake 
of migration but also for effects moderating transnational conflicts. For example, Algerian 
communities and organizations in France, on the whole, have probably had a moderating 
effect on the situation in Algeria since 1992 (Miller 2000): In that year the Islamic Salvation 
Front was barred from attaining power and a civil-war like situation has ensued, which has 
been going on until today. Also, a balanced appraisal of immigration and security cannot 
overlook that sometimes immigrants themselves are those interested in dismantling terrorist 
groups. For example, it was Arab-background immigrants who helped French police to 
dismantle the Armed Islamic Group in 1995. Such evidence comes from Turkish immigrants 
in Germany and their role in tackling extortion practices by the Kurdish PKK (cf. Faist 2000b). 
It is worth noting that substantial conflicts in countries of origin such as Algeria and Turkey 
have at times spilled over since the 1970s but did at no time significantly endanger state or 
human security in France and Germany.  
To draw up an interim balance concerning the post cold war period, the emergence of the 
migration-security nexus cannot be explained exclusively by actual threats to state and 
human security, as threats to the physical integrity of persons in immigration societies or 
endangering the institutional integrity of states receiving immigration. We thus need to take a 
closer look at the political psychological mechanisms of threat construction. 
To start with, 9/11 and the dangers apparent are not simply made up. This was a murderous 
event. We know from research on intergroup relations, intolerance, elite decision-making, 
and reactions to terrorism before 9/11 that the responses by governments and publics to 
threats have been going mainly in one direction. The research carried out on these 
phenomena in various fields of the social sciences such as social psychology, political 
psychology and sociology arrives at remarkably similar conclusions. Diverse studies have 
found that external threat results in a broad tendency to heighten in-group solidarity, vilify the 
source of threat, limit government actions that might assist members of the threatening 
group, and support belligerent solutions directed at the threatening individuals or group (For 
many, see Coser 1956, Cottam 1994, Gibson 1998; Sales & Friend 1973). It is needless to 
say that these reactions can be readily observed in responses to 9/11. 
But we need to dig deeper. 9/11 seems to have reinforced the trend towards securitizing 
migration and immigration – it did not create it from scratch. Immigration – not only when 
connected to terrorism – has usually resulted in an increase in perceived threats. Even in 
less dramatic instances not connected to terrorism but to material threats and the import of 
conflicts from countries of origin into countries of settlement of immigrants, the security 
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narrative demands that fear and objectless fear – Angst – have to be controlled. In the end, 
the migration-security nexus under the circumstances before 9/11 also dealt with cultural 
values affected that are linked to ontological security, and thus existential threats. As 
immigration history shows, foreigners or immigrants were frequently perceived to threaten 
cultural identity (cf. Zolberg 1987). Wild swings in immigration policy have not only come 
about by infrastructural considerations or material threats but also as a result of fears about 
the cultural fabric of societies. Examples reach from anti-Chinese legislation in North 
America and Australia in the late 19th century (Saxton 1971) to alleged Muslim threats in 
Europe in the late 20th century (e.g. Kepel 1997). 
Clearly, on the surface 9/11 suggested that international migration is inextricably linked to 
terrorism, not simply in the indirect ways just mentioned. 9/11 was not about international 
migrants posing threats to “our” jobs, incomes, housing or culture. It was a direct attack and 
a threat to death. However, the links between international migration and security threats are 
inconclusive even after 9/11. Migration and security only superficially share the fact that 
border crossings are involved. Moreover, not all flows of persons across the borders of 
sovereign states constitute migration. Tourists and business travelers account for more 
border crossings than labor migrants or refugees (IOM 2001). In particular, the link between 
migration and increases in other phenomena, such as drug trafficking and crime, is vastly 
overstated. Potentially, large immigration flows may enhance the opportunities and provide 
low-cost means such as couriers to distribute drugs. Also, immigrant communities such as 
secluded religious sects could make it easier for would-be terrorists to find anonymity. And in 
exceptional circumstances of large immigration flows some native workers may be adversely 
affected by immigrants in terms of jobs and wages. But it is a long stretch from there to argue 
that even a partial solution to certain country’s drug, crime, unemployment and physical 
security problems would be significantly affected by acting on immigration flows. Moreover, 
even stricter border controls do not constitute a suitable means to combat terrorism. 
Immigration and visa control policies are far less likely to catch a determined terrorist than 
they are to control unauthorized immigration. 
Given this context, it is worth noting, however, that migration policies are often even 
institutionally linked to crime. This clearly goes beyond merely discursive connections. For 
example, the European Union (EU) created two groups in the 1980s – the TREVI group, in 
which ministers of justice and interior discussed issues of police cooperation including 
terrorism; and the Ad hoc Group on Asylum and Immigration, where the same ministers met 
informally to discuss the harmonization of asylum and immigration policies. These two 
groups were the forerunners of the Justice and Home Affairs Council and successive 
institutional EU mechanisms to deal with these policy areas. Such institutional connections 
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between terrorism, crime and migration – which are distinct from border-crossing traffic – 
send ambiguous signals to populist politicians and audiences. They reinforce – albeit not on 
the same scale as 9/11 – already existing scenarios of threat although politicians of 
mainstream parties take great care to escape such charges. The political uses of 9/11 have 
exacerbated the already existing discursive linkages of threat, migration and the clashes of 
cultures. 
3 Unintended Consequences of Securitizing 
Migration – Reinforcing Meta-Politics 
The border control initiatives of national states in Europe and North America before 9/11 
were politically successful policy failures that succeeded in terms of their symbolic and image 
effects even while sometimes or even largely failing in terms of their deterrent effects. 
According to the Continuing Observation System on International Migration, the estimated 
number of irregular border-crossings and irregular migrants has by no means decreased 
during the 1990s – the reverse assumption may render a truer picture (e.g. SOPEMI 1991). 
Since September 11 internal and external control of migrants has increased. In particular, 
measures which try to handle the migrant as an illegal border crosser make him or her more 
visible as an alien. For example, due to ever-stricter border controls unauthorized viz. 
irregular migration gains more visibility. The very collection of statistics may legitimize stricter 
border controls and could further contribute to the perception of the migrant as illegitimate 
and potentially criminal, although politicians take great care to accuse the traffickers and 
depict the migrants as victims. All of this has an ironic side to it because border control is one 
of the few remaining fields in which major immigration states have shown that their autonomy 
has not been hampered by growing globalization of the flow of people.  
Yet stepping up migration control visibly, governments will have to show that their increased 
control efforts show visible results. For example, the number of illegal border crossers 
apprehended may need to go up. And governments have to uphold migration as a potential 
security threat. Otherwise, it would be hard to justify increased resources devoted to the 
control of internal and external borders. This creates incentives for meta-politics; following a 
lead by Harold Lasswell who had coined the term “meta-issue” (cf. Faist 1994): Meta-politics 
connects social problems and security concerns with fears around international migration. 
Immigration can be referred to by politicians in explaining many social, economic and security 
problems – such as unemployment, housing shortages, crime – without having to give concrete 
evidence, not the least because the effects of immigration are exceedingly hard to establish 
empirically with a sufficient degree of certainty. The academic and public disputes over the fiscal 
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impact of immigration are just one prominent case in point (for an overview, see Fix & Passel 
1994). In referring to these fears and in being responsive to the expectations of their 
constituency, especially politicians from populist parties have in fact introduced and reinforced 
xenophobic tendencies. This is not to say that threats to security in immigration countries are 
without any real-world foundation. However, through meta-politics, low-level threats usually gain 
out-of-proportion significance. Meta-politics also means that political decision-making engages 
in symbolic efforts instead of offering substantive policy solutions. Of course, all politics has a 
symbolic content. Otherwise, political actors could not aggregate and articulate interests and 
mobilize supporters. However, meta-politics unsettles the always-precarious balance between 
the material and symbolic content of politics in connecting substantive issues such as 
unemployment and security to symbols which signify threats in factually incorrect ways. 
One implication of meta-politics is the ever-renewed juxtaposition and dualism of “us” (the 
Americans, the Germans, etc.) versus “them” (the immigrants, the Muslims, etc.) which is 
both deeply regressive and pervasive in a globalizing society. Editorials in leading 
newspapers around the West have pointed out that after 9/11 postmodern ambiguities are 
out of date and have been replaced by a clear trench line between liberalism vs. terrorism.1 
One may easily extend this link further to liberalism versus Islamic or Christian 
fundamentalism. But such simplicity overlooks the fact that wanton violence is itself aided by 
globalization and is also reproduced internally in those societies imbued with Western 
values. The massacre at Waco, Texas, is just one prominent example; the bombing in 
Oklahoma City another. To state the obvious: the ‘Una-bomber’ of Oklahoma City was not an 
immigrant with an Arab background but a mentally deranged former US-American physics 
professor. 
Meta-politics may also obscure the fact that an onslaught on civil rights has taken place 
which not only affects non-citizens such as aliens and permanent residents viz. denizens but 
also citizens. Legislation passed in major western liberal democracies in the immediate 
aftermath of 9/11 provides ample evidence for this claim. In the USA, Congress passed a bill 
in October 2001 which increased government’s ability to supervise all residents. The UK 
followed swiftly and moved even further in 2003. In Germany, in December 2001, new 
legislation increased not only funds for the police force but also their powers of investigating 
and even shutting down suspicious bodies such as religious organizations which are not 
                                                
1 Two of many examples are: Josef Joffe, “Das Weltgericht der Hundert Tage. Der 11. September, der Krieg 
gegen den Fanatismus und die Wiederentdeckung des Besten am Westen” (The World Judgement of 100 Days: 
11 September, the War against Fanaticism and the Redisocovery of the Best in the West), Die Zeit, 27 December 
2001, p.1, and “Der Glaube der Ungläubigen. Welche Werte hat der Westen?“ (The Belief of the Non-Believers. 
Which Values has the West?), Der Spiegel 52, 2001, pp. 50-66. 
Working Papers – Center on Migration, Citizenship and Development 
- 12 - 
conforming to constitutional norms. To give one last example, French legislation passed in 
November 2001 provided more means for police and security forces to invade daily life, such 
as a new rule connected to quiet behavior in entrance halls to large apartment buildings and 
the punishment of people who do not ‘regularly’ purchase a valid ticket for public 
transportation. It is needless to say that this also aims at controlling youth of immigrant 
background in the banlieus (cf. Césari 2001).  
In general, state security institutions such as the armed forces, the police and intelligence 
agencies are known to deal with problems such as 9/11 in a way that enables them to use 
their traditional and familiar solutions (cf. Allison 1971) – in this case ranging from military 
attacks to increased external and internal border controls. In this perspective, not only 
increased control of migrants but the whole ‘war on terrorism’ is a large-scale effort to cast 
bewildering developments such as non-state terrorism into familiar molds. After 9/11, the 
state governments and the state security forces have been themselves heavily engaged in 
the construction of a political threat that can then be addressed by traditional means. 
Whether or not the threat attacked bears close resemblance with real-world phenomena is 
another question. 
4 Implications for Immigrant Integration – Cultural 
Pluralism 
In the country most obviously affected by the aftershocks of 9/11, Muslim organizations and 
communities experienced a dramatic new situation (Leonard 2003): The spotlight of politics 
and mass media was directed towards them. The issues in public debate have focused on 
issues such as foreign vs. domestic rootedness of Muslim organizations, the use of violence, 
and gender relations. Immediately after 9/11 the U.S. Administration looked for Muslim 
leaders who would what the government stipulated: ‘denounce fundamentalist 
hatemongering’. It found them, often outside the organized Muslim communities. It was not 
the leaders of mosques and other religious or political organizations who were the most 
visible spokespersons for Muslim groups after 9/11. This is surprising because Muslim 
organizations have been characterized by a new wave of leadership over the past years. 
This new stratum does not come from spiritual leaders – for example imams – but from 
professional circles, such as lawyers, medical doctors or business executives. In short, most 
Muslim communities in the USA are nowadays run by quite secular leaders who consider 
good relations to mass media as a prime resource. They played only a marginal role, 
however, in the media hype following 9/11. Figures marginal to Muslim communities took 
center stage and commanded national attention immediately after 9/11. One prominent 
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example is Shayk Hamza Yusuf, a white American convert with Sufi leanings. Born Mark 
Hanson, he converted to Islam at age 17 in the San Francisco Bay Area. Widely traveled, he 
has studied with Islamic scholars in Algeria, Morocco and Mauretania. He is a charismatic 
speaker and produces numerous, widely circulated videos and cassettes. His public 
appearances often generate enthusiastic audiences. Hamza Yusuf held no office in national 
Muslim political organizations. Yet he was one of six religious leaders and the only Muslim to 
meet with President George W. Bush at the White House immediately after the murderous 
attack on the twin towers. Shayk Hamza Yusuf also denounced all kinds of violence. He thus 
corresponded to the expectations of journalists and politicians, who sought out moderate 
Muslims, urging them to speak up, to deplore and repudiate the violent acts and those who 
would justify them in any way.  
We might interpret this as a specific US-American tale of dealing media-wise with 9/11 and 
Muslim minorities. However, the one-sided media attention on converts as spokespersons 
has initiated a debate within Muslim organizations not only about media visibility but also 
about substantial religious and political viewpoints, such as criticism of certain political 
regimes in the Middle East and South Asia. The hard and frequent look by American mass 
media on Islam and Muslims has also forced the national Muslim leadership to now speak 
out more openly about their positions on political accommodation and gender relations. At 
the same time, their rhetoric against the U.S. government subsided. To say the least, a 
process of intensified deliberations within Muslim organizations has been started on sensitive 
and contentious issues. Topics have included, for example, the hiring of local religious 
leaders, imams. The demand to hire only American-educated imams who are fluent in 
English and to train both imams and board members has been voiced more frequently in 
community newspapers. Also, some Muslim political organizations have tried to come up 
with younger and female leaders (cf. Leonard 2003). On the short run, all this contributes to 
more political tensions between Muslim organizations and ‘mainstream’ establishment. 
Nonetheless, these are signs of incipient political incorporation into American public life. 
To take a cursory look at a European example, German political life certainly does not offer 
so much leeway for marginal yet intellectual and charismatic young religious converts to 
Islam. This may be, by the way, partly due to the fact that there is much less of a Muslim 
intelligentsia in Germany compared to the US. After all, migration of the category of persons 
called Muslims in Germany has predominantly occurred in the context of former 
‘guestworker’ migration, while the mass immigration patterns of Muslims to the US has been 
of more recent vintage, mostly since the 1980s. Most important, this immigration has been 
socio-economically much more diverse in the US than in Europe. However, we can observe 
similar trends of increased public and political dialogue if not cooptation, and efforts by the 
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political gatekeepers to include Muslim organizations at least in consultative roles. Similar to 
the US Administration, German government officials such as Federal President Johannes 
Rau have invited religious leaders. Unlike the US-American example, the German corporatist 
tradition has led to invite representatives of a wide range of Muslim organizations. However, 
the dialogue has not only been across groups but also within. The city of Bremen in the 
Northwestern part of Germany, for example, has figured prominently as a role model to be 
emulated by others because of its allegedly successful framework of including all varieties of 
Muslim, Christian and Jewish organizations and the so-called “Islam week”, during which 
representatives from organizations ranging from the Islamist Milli Görüş to secularized Alevi 
communities are supposed to co-operate in order to enter into a ‘dialogue’ with the non-
Muslim public. This bright Bremen public image was stained somewhat when it became 
known that one of the regular visitors to one of the inner-city mosques had been detained by 
the U.S. military at Guantanamo Bay, charged with ties to the former Taliban regime and the 
terrorist Al Qu’aida. Nonetheless, in the respective Bremen mosque this sparked an intra-
Muslim debate about the relationship of religion and politics, and more nuanced newspaper 
reporting on the diverse views held in Muslim communities and organizations on this crucial 
issue.  
In sum, whether or not the aftermath of 9/11 and heightened public attention to Muslim 
religious and political organizations in the US, Germany and beyond will eventually result in 
increased immersion or even incorporation of such groups in political life, is too early to say. 
It may suffice to draw the preliminary conclusion that on various sides the awareness to 
urgently include Muslim organizations in regular political and religious life has grown much 
stronger. Perhaps we see increased efforts of political gatekeepers to co-opt Muslim leaders; 
along the lines practiced for two decades by French authorities, which led to the 
establishment of a beur-geoisie. 
We should also be careful about the impact of 9/11 on wider issues of immigrant integration, 
such as tolerance towards cultural pluralism. Muslims all over Europe and the USA have 
suffered increased hostility and physical attacks, especially in the first months after 9/11. For 
example, in the stronghold of European multiculturalism, the United Kingdom alone, more 
than 300 assaults on Muslims were reported in the first three months after the terrorist 
attacks (Eurobarometer 2001). Similar observations can be made for other countries such as 
Germany, France, and the Netherlands. We would thus expect that public support for state 
accommodation of Muslims’ religious practices would have decreased after 9/11.  
Yet, according to data there is some initial evidence that at least public attitudes towards 
Muslim religious practices have not changed dramatically after 9/11 (Fetzer & Soper 2002): 
Working Papers – Center on Migration, Citizenship and Development 
- 15 - 
This preliminary evidence comes from a Roper survey on “Religion and the State” carried out 
in three European countries before 9/11 in July 2001 and after 9/11 in April of 2002. The 
countries included were the UK, France and Germany. One item aimed to measure toleration 
of Islamic religious practices. The questions asked were different in the three countries 
because state-religion relations and public debates around the integration of new religious 
beliefs have varied across these countries. The specific item concerned public support of 
Islamic religious practices pertaining to schools. In the UK, the question was: Should the 
state continue to fund Islamic schools? In Germany, it read: Should the state support Islamic 
religious instruction in public schools? In France, the question aimed at whether it should be 
tolerated or allowed to wear a headscarf. Interestingly, the empirical results only partially 
confirm the expectation that public support for state accommodation of Muslims’ religious 
practices in the schools decreased. In all three countries, respondents were less likely after 
9/11 to support the accommodation of Islam in state-run schools. However, in none of the 
three countries did the interviewees not become markedly anti-Islamic: their propensity to 
oppose accommodation only changed by a few percentage points in Britain and Germany; 
while the French result was statistically insignificant. This is noteworthy because most 
respondents probably knew from mass media reports that some of 9/11 terrorists lived in 
Germany and Britain. Overall, the respondents in the UK and Germany seem to be far more 
tolerant towards Islam than reports in the popular press might suggest.  
We can only speculate about explanations for this result. Maybe we need to take a closer 
look at the realms in which immigrants can legitimately express cultural difference from 
majority groups. Historically, for example, the so-called ‘ethnic groups’ in the USA in the first 
half of the 20th century could continue displaying cultural difference in the field of religion. 
This was not seen to contradict assimilationist goals (Herberg 1955). Religious affiliation has 
been a legitimate way to express cultural difference. Such a finding should even be more 
applicable nowadays, as cultural pluralist tendencies have certainly gained increased 
acceptance over the past decades in the USA and Europe.  
5 Conclusion: Vicious and Virtuous 
Transnationalization  
The responses to 9/11 and their consequences, such as a rise in meta-politics and 
discussions on the accommodation of Muslims in Western immigration countries, have 
profound implications for a research agenda on migration and security. So far, there is an 
imbalance in research on migration and security. Following public discourses, migration 
scholars have mostly either defensively argued against making a link between migration and 
Working Papers – Center on Migration, Citizenship and Development 
- 16 - 
terrorism or have pointed out substantial security threats for people and states emanating out 
of civil wars, refugee flows, and nationalist struggles involving categories such as militant 
refugee warriors. Without denying the importance of such analyses, it is vital that they be 
complemented by two extensions. Obviously, the first task includes the rigorous study of the 
meta-politics of migration and security as part of migration politics. This does not only include 
the study of anti-immigrant violence but also the rhetoric of regular immigration politics and 
thus the securitization of migration and integration issues.  
The second task is to extend our knowledge not only about the role of transnational 
processes in order to counter the easy linkage made between international migration and 
terrorism. This implies that we not only study the import viz. export of conflicts through 
international migration such as ‘long-distance nationalism’ (Benedict Anderson) but also 
more virtuous cycles of transnationalization such as the diffusion of human and civil rights 
with the help of émigrés, migrants and refugees. 9/11 has once again confirmed what has 
already been evident from less spectacular forms and manifestations of international 
terrorism: the growing importance of non-state actors in the contemporary world system (cf. 
Held et al. 1999). This implies a study of political, economic and cultural transnationalization 
in all its facets. In this way we can hope to unearth both the vicious and the virtuous cycles of 
transnational processes.  
This research emphasis would constitute one modest step towards removing fuzzy fantasies 
about the proverbial “stranger” and “migrant” as a security threat. This is important because, 
at first sight, the events of 9/11 have dealt another devastating blow to the Kantian utopia of 
perpetual peace. Yet, we need to be aware of the ambiguous dynamics of globalization. The 
age of globalization demands to renew Kant’s vision. Immanuel Kant argued that perpetual 
peace is possible in a system of republics, which we would now call liberal democracies, 
governed by the rule of law (Kant 1970). He wrote about a federation of states as one 
guaranty of peace. Nowadays this vision has to be supplemented by an empirical analysis of 
how transnationalizing civil societies may underpin the diffusion of human, civil and political 
rights. We thus should not only think about the ordering of the ‘world of states’ as a 
prerequisite for a more peaceful global order. Instead, we certainly need to include the ‘world 
of societies’. Sometimes we then find ourselves indeed studying instances and vicious cycles 
of non-state violence crossing borders. This is important because there is a definite trend in 
our post-Westphalian political world, in which the sovereign powers of states are challenged 
and essential elements such as territoriality transformed – without being replaced (Ruggie 
1993). International migration is one of the fields in which this can be exemplified. After all, 
international migrants actively voice ideas and interests in this transnational realm. This 
could act as a corrective to the current overemphasis on the migration-security nexus. In 
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sum, in the world after 9/11 we need to search for a balanced way in studying vicious and 
virtuous cycles of transnational, non-state collective action and the ensuing responses by 
states and other governance structures. 
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